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There is robust evidence showing a link between executive function (EF) and theory of
mind (ToM) in 3- to 5-year-olds. However, it is unclear whether this relationship extends
to middle childhood. In addition, there has been much discussion about the nature of this
relationship. Whereas some authors claim that ToM is needed for EF, others argue that
ToM requires EF.To date, however, studies examining the longitudinal relationship between
distinct subcomponents of EF [i.e., attention shifting, working memory (WM) updating,
inhibition] and ToM in middle childhood are rare. The present study examined (1) the
relationship between three EF subcomponents (attention shifting,WMupdating, inhibition)
andToM in middle childhood, and (2) the longitudinal reciprocal relationships between the
EF subcomponents andToM across a 1-year period. EF andToM measures were assessed
experimentally in a sample of 1,657 children (aged 6–11 years) at time point one (t1)
and 1 year later at time point two (t2). Results showed that the concurrent relationships
between all three EF subcomponents andToM pertained in middle childhood at t1 and t2,
respectively, even when age, gender, and ﬂuid intelligence were partialled out. Moreover,
cross-lagged structural equation modeling (again, controlling for age, gender, and ﬂuid
intelligence, as well as for the earlier levels of the target variables), revealed partial support
for the view that earlyToM predicts later EF, but stronger evidence for the assumption that
early EF predicts later ToM. The latter was found for attention shifting and WM updating,
but not for inhibition.This reveals the importance of studying the exact interplay ofToM and
EF across childhood development, especially with regard to different EF subcomponents.
Most likely, understanding others’ mental states at different levels of perspective-taking
requires speciﬁc EF subcomponents, suggesting developmental change in the relations
between EF andToM across childhood.
Keywords: executive function, theory of mind, longitudinal, middle childhood, attention shifting, inhibition,
working memory updating
INTRODUCTION
A major achievement of early development occurs when a child is
able to impute mental states to himself/herself and others in order
to predict and explain behavior (“theory of mind,”ToM; Frith and
Frith,1999). This ability enables the individual to function in social
groups and thus constitutes a crucial aspect of social competence.
The development of ToM starts when the child is an infant and
continues right the way through to the adolescent years (Lalonde
and Chandler, 2002).
A critical test for ToM is the ﬁrst-order false-belief task which is
mastered at around the age of 4 years. One classical task requires
the child to infer which belief a character in a story has about
the location of an object which has been hidden in the character’s
presence, and has then been hidden somewhere else without the
character knowing this (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). As children
progress through childhood, they are able to solve more complex,
so-calledhigher-orderToMtasks. Oneof themost commonlyused
is the second-order false-belief task (Perner and Wimmer, 1985)
which requires the child to infer a story character’s belief about
another person’s belief. The age of mastering second-order false-
belief ranges from about 6–7 years, depending on the sample and
method used (for a review see Miller, 2009).
Several related abilities of ToM have been identiﬁed of which
executive function (EF) in particular has received considerable
investigation and has led to much theoretical discussion. EF refers
to an array of different processes relating to self-control. They
develop in the preschool years and continue to do so right up
to adolescence (Zelazo and Carlson, 2012). These processes enable
the control of thought, action, and emotion, and they include over-
lapping but distinct EF subcomponents such as attention shifting,
inhibition, and updating of working memory (WM updating;
Miyake et al., 2000). As regards these speciﬁc EF subcomponents,
ToM(ﬁrst-order false-belief) understanding appears to require the
ability to suppress one’s own knowledge about reality (inhibition)
in order to be able to put oneself into the shoes of the other (atten-
tion shifting) and then actively hold the key elements of the story
in mind where this information can be monitored and updated in
order to make an inference (WM updating; Doherty, 2009).
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There is robust evidence that links ToM, (especially ﬁrst-order
false-belief) and these aforementioned speciﬁc EF subcompo-
nents – including inhibition (Hughes, 1998a; Carlson and Moses,
2001; Flynn et al., 2004), attention shifting (Frye et al., 1995;
Hughes, 1998a), andWMupdating (Davis and Pratt, 1995; Keenan
et al., 1998) in children aged 3–5 years (see Perner and Lang,
1999, for a review). Several reasons for this relationship have been
put forward. For example, EF and ToM make major develop-
ments during the preschool years, they seem to share a common
neurological basis (prefrontal cortex), and individuals suffering
from autism show deﬁciencies in both (Carlson and Moses, 2001;
Hill, 2004).
In need of clariﬁcation is whether the robust relationship
between EF and ToM found in preschoolers extends to older chil-
dren. Although there is some evidence that more advanced EF
and ToM measures do show positive associations, more stud-
ies are needed to conﬁrm this (Miller, 2009). For instance,
it has been found that the EF–ToM relationship extends to
children between 41/2 and 61/2 years for second-order false-
belief tasks and more demanding EF tasks (Perner et al., 2002).
Similar results have been reported for children of middle child-
hood (Yang et al., 2009; Calderon et al., 2010) and in ado-
lescents (Vetter et al., 2013). However, results in a sample of
81/2 year-olds with and without attention deﬁcit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) were less conclusive (Charman et al., 2001).
A correlation between EF and ToM was found in the con-
trol group (typically developing children) but as soon as age
and intelligence were partialled out, the two constructs were
no longer signiﬁcantly correlated. These inconsistent results
show that more studies are needed to clarify the relationship
between EF and ToM in older children. This is of partic-
ular importance in order to understand whether both con-
structs remain intertwined in the course of development. It
may well be that the link between ToM and EF is less rele-
vant once sufﬁcient cognitive capacities have developed, thereby
making it less relevant to regulate one’s own knowledge and
view of the world when inferring others’ mental states. There-
fore, the ﬁrst aim of the current study was to investigate
whether the EF–ToM relationship extends to middle childhood,
and especially, how different EF subcomponents (i.e., atten-
tion shifting, WM updating, inhibition) are related to ToM at
this age.
Furthermore, an important and controversial question that
remains unresolved concerns the causal direction of effect between
EF and ToM. Perner (1998; Perner and Lang, 1999, 2000; see also
Carruthers, 1996) and Russell (1996, 1997; see also Pacherie, 1997)
both maintain that a functional dependency between the two con-
structs exists but they make opposite predictions as regards the
direction of effect.
Perner (1998) claim that the ability to represent mental states
on a meta-level is needed for the development of executive
control, i.e., ToM enhances EF. In other words, this meta-
representational account claims that children need to have a
sufﬁciently developed understanding of their own minds before
they will be able to engage in executive control. Russell’s (1996,
1997) theory, on the other hand, claims the exact opposite, i.e.,
EF is a prerequisite for the emergence of ToM understanding.
According to this view, EF is necessary in order to distance
oneself from reality and move toward abstract mental states
(ToM).
An explanation as to why there is little agreement on the causal
relationship between EF and ToM lies in the fact that many stud-
ies have based their conclusions on correlational data. There are
three types of evidence in order to progress beyond correlational
studies (Miller, 2009). First, by means of longitudinal studies (if
A predicts B, A must start developing before B). Second, by means
of dissociation studies (if A causes B, then A should occur without
B; but the opposite should not take place). Third, by means of
training studies (if A is trained, what effect, if any, does it have
on B?).
There is empirical support for all three types of evidence.
First, although there are still relatively few studies examining
the longitudinal relationship between EF and ToM performance,
there has been a recent increase in the amount of research car-
ried out (Hughes, 2011), including different ages and time spans
ranging from very short intervals in so-called microgenetic stud-
ies, a method in which the process of developmental change is
closely observed and analyzed trial-by-trial, (e.g., Flynn et al.,
2004; Flynn, 2007) to longer intervals of up to 1 year (Carlson
et al., 2004; Hughes and Ensor, 2007). These studies have mostly
been conducted in the preschool or late toddlerhood years. A gen-
eral ﬁnding at this early age is that stronger support is found
for the proposal that early EF predicts later ToM than for the
view that early ToM predicts later EF. For instance, one of the
earliest studies showed that early EF performance (in particu-
lar inhibitory control) at age 4 predicted later ToM performance
(1 year later), but the reverse was not true (Hughes, 1998b). In a
study conducted with 2-year-olds, this pattern of early EF pre-
dicting later ToM (15 months later) persisted even when age,
gender, and verbal ability were taken into account (Carlson et al.,
2004). However, different ToM tasks were used at the two points
of measurement, and therefore it is questionable whether the
same construct was measured at each time point. This assump-
tion is supported by the ﬁnding that the two ToM measures did
not correlate over time. Yet, a longitudinal study that included
three time points (time intervals ranging from 9 to 12.5 months),
also found evidence for the view that earlier EF predicted later
ToM in 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (Hughes and Ensor, 2007). Others
have found similar results (Jahromi and Stifter, 2008; Müller et al.,
2012).
However, other longitudinal studies do not support the view
that early EF predicts later ToM. For instance, Schneider et al.
(2005) in a study including three time points did not ﬁnd pre-
dictive relationships between EF and ToM in either direction after
controlling for age and language (Schneider et al., 2005). As noted
by the authors, one reason for this ﬁnding might have been the
fact that initial ToM understanding was low and continued to be
so throughout the study period.
The focus of longitudinal studies conducted to date has mostly
been on early development of EF and ToM from toddlerhood up
to the preschool years. Studies in older children are rare despite
the importance of examining whether patterns found in early
life remain throughout the course of the child’s development
(McAlister and Peterson, 2013).
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The few studies that have investigated the longitudinal relation-
ship between EF and ToM in children beyond the preschool years
show inconsistent results. A study by Farrant et al. (2012) in chil-
dren aged 5 (at t1) found that early EF predicted later ToM, thus
supporting Russell’s (1996) theory and replicating general ﬁndings
of longitudinal studies in younger children. However, a 1-year lon-
gitudinal study with 5-year-old children showed that early EF did
not predict later ToM (Razza and Blair, 2009). But EF at t2 was
not assessed, so the reverse direction of early ToM predicting later
EF could not be tested. A further study in 4-year-old children (at
t1) even found the opposite, namely that early ToM predicted later
EF even when controlling for age, language, siblings and initial EF
(McAlister and Peterson, 2013), thus in line with Perner’s theory
(Perner, 1998).
Taken together, longitudinal studies yielded mixed results on
the exact nature of the causal relation between EF and ToM. If
anything, there seems to be stronger evidence for Russel’s theory
that EF is a prerequisite for ToM than for Perner’s theory that ToM
supports EF (Russell, 1996, 1997; Perner, 1998).
The second type of evidence concerns dissociation studies.
Perner’s and Russel’s theories make opposing predictions with
respect to EF–ToM deﬁciencies. Perner’s account excludes the pos-
sibility that well-developed EF occurs paired with poor ToM: ToM
is seen as a prerequisite for EF, and therefore ToM deﬁcits should
lead to impaired EF. Butwhat is in linewith his theory is the reverse
pattern of well-developed ToM paired with EF deﬁcits because
intact ToM is necessary for EF, but not sufﬁcient in its own right.
On the other hand, Russel’s theory does not allow for deﬁcits in EF
to be paired with adequate ToM because his theory proposes that
impaired EF leads to impaired ToM. His theory does permit the
pattern of well-developed EF paired with deﬁcits in ToM because
the ToM impairment could have been caused by other factors, e.g.,
language, in particular inner speech (Pellicano, 2007).
Several dissociation studies indicate that EF is not required for
the development of ToM, thus contradicting Russel’s theory. For
example, a study conducted by Tager-Flusberg et al. (1997) and
reanalyzed by Perner and Lang (2000) showed that children with
Williams syndrome and Prader-Willi syndrome were impaired on
EF tasks but mastered ToM tasks well. However, due to the small
sample size (N = 6), results must be treated with caution. Stud-
ies on children diagnosed with ADHD showed a similar pattern,
i.e., reasonably well-developed ToM skills paired with poor EF
(Charman et al., 2001; Perner et al., 2002). However, it may well
be that children in these studies mastered the ToM tasks in atyp-
ical ways, for instance by applying simple behavior rules (e.g.,
“doesn’t see, doesn’t know”; Garnham and Ruffman, 2001). If so,
the relevance of EF for ToM would not be challenged by these
results.
Other dissociation studies have found evidence contradicting
Perner’s theory. Although autism typically involves low EF paired
with low ToM (e.g., Hill, 2004), a study in 5 12 year-old children
with autism revealed a dissociation in exactly the opposite direc-
tion: a high level of EF with impaired ToM (Pellicano, 2007).
Similarly, a cross-cultural study comparing U.S. and Chinese chil-
dren aged about 4 years, controlled for age and verbal ability,
found that although Chinese children had good executive control
skills, their ToM understanding was poor (Sabbagh et al., 2006).
Thus, evidence fromdissociation studies revealed support for both
Perner’s and Russel’s theories.
The third and ﬁnal type of empirical support comes from
training studies. For instance, a very recent study revealed the
importance of EF for the improvement in the development of
ToM. Preschool-aged children (aged 3 years 8 months) were given
a battery of false-belief and EF tasks. Results showed that individ-
ual differences in initial EF predicted the degree towhich children’s
advances in ToM improved through ToM training, the relevant
control variables being partialled out (Benson et al., 2013). How-
ever, a training study by Kloo and Perner (2003) did not support
the view that early EF predicts later ToM to the same extent.
They examined ToM via false-belief tasks, and attention shift-
ing via the dimensional change card sort task (DCCS; Frye et al.,
1995). Children (3- to 4-year-olds) were trained in these tasks
about once a week over a period of ∼ weeks. Transfer of train-
ing took place in both directions: training on the DCCS task
improved performance on the false-belief task, and false-belief
training produced improvements on the DCCS task. This ﬁnding
is in support of the idea of functional dependency between EF
and ToM. However, it is interesting to note that training on the
false-belief task did not lead to an improvement in post-training
false-belief performance, which makes the interpretation of these
ﬁndings problematical.
To sum up the three types of evidence, the general ﬁnding
(particularly from longitudinal studies) in children younger than
4 years is that early EF predicts later ToM, and not vice versa. How-
ever, studies in older children have revealed inconsistent results.
More research is needed to clarify the causal direction between
EF and ToM in older children. In particular, possible differential
relations between EF subcomponents and ToM are understud-
ied to date. Therefore, the second aim of the present study was
to examine whether each of the three EF subcomponents (atten-
tion shifting, WM updating, inhibition) at t1 predicted ToM at t2
(1 year later), or vice versa, in elementary school-aged children.
The current study investigated three subcomponents of EF (i.e.,
inhibition, attention shifting, WM updating) as well as ToM in a
large sample of 6- to 12-year-old children. Moreover, we exam-
ined relations between EF and ToM controlled for age, gender
and ﬂuid intelligence. All tasks were administered at two measure-
ment points which were about 1 year apart. Based on the evidence
reviewed so far, we hypothesized ﬁrst, the EF–ToM relationship to
pertain in middle childhood. Thus, positive correlations should
occur between EF and ToM performance in our sample. More
speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that the three EF subcomponents and
ToM at t1 are as strongly correlated as 1 year later at t2. Second, we
expected to ﬁnd relationships leading from EF subcomponents-t1
to ToM-t2, and not vice versa.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that addresses these
issues in a representative sample of children in middle childhood.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
At t1 (in 2012), the sample consisted of N = 1,657 children (52%
girls) aged between 6 and 11 years (M = 8.3 years, SD = 0.95).
Time point 2 (t2; in 2013) took place 1 year later (N = 1,619) and
children’s age ranged from7 to 12 years (M = 9.1 years, SD = 0.92).
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Participants were recruited from 33 primary schools from the
federal state of Brandenburg, Germany. To establish a representa-
tive sample, schools were preselected so that participants coming
from different rural and urban areas and socio-economic back-
grounds were included. Before the study began, approval of all
procedures was granted by the Research Ethics Committee at the
University of Potsdam and the Ministry of Education, Youth,
and Sports of the Federal State of Brandenburg. For each child,
informed consentwas obtained from theparent/primary caregiver.
As a reward the children received a voucher for the cinema.
MATERIAL
EF tasks
The EF subcomponent attention shifting was assessed using
the Cognitive Attention shifting task (Röthlisberger et al., 2010;
adapted from Zimmermann et al., 2002). Children were presented
with a single-colored ﬁsh and a multi-colored ﬁsh appearing
simultaneously on the left- and right-hand side of a computer
screen. Participants were told to “feed” each kind of ﬁsh, alternat-
ing between the two, by pressing one of two keys on a QWERTZ
keyboard (i.e., the X-key for the ﬁsh on the left, the M-key for the
ﬁsh on the right). Across several trials, the side on which the two
kinds of ﬁsh appeared changed randomly, requiring the children to
remember their response of the previous trial in order to maintain
the requirement of alternating feeding. The task consisted of a total
of 46 trials (interstimulus intervals ranged from 300 to 700 ms)
that were separated by a short break during which positive feed-
back was given. The dependent variable was the number of correct
responses for the 22 switch trials. Switch trials were those answers
that required children to change their response pattern (i.e., from
pressing left/right to left/left or right/right).
The EF subcomponent WM updating was assessed using the
Digit-Span Backward task (Petermann and Petermann, 2007).
Participants were told a sequence of digits which they had to
verbally repeat in the reverse order. The ﬁrst sequence was two
digits long. There were two sequences of equal length in each
trial. Within each trial, at least one sequence had to be answered
correctly in order to proceed to the next trial in which the
sequence was lengthened by one digit. The dependent variable
was the total number of sequences that had been remembered
correctly.
The EF subcomponent inhibition was assessed by the Fruit
Stroop task (Archibald and Kerns, 1999; adapted by Röthlisberger
et al., 2010). The task consisted of four trials. For each trial, a page
depicting 25 stimuli was presented to the child with the instruc-
tion to name the colors of the items as quickly as possible. Page
1 showed colored rectangles (blue, red, green, yellow). Page 2
depicted fruits or vegetables in their typical colors (banana – yel-
low, lettuce – green, strawberry – red, plum – blue). Page 3 showed
the same fruits but these were colored gray. Page 4 showed the
same fruits and vegetables, but all colored incorrectly. For pages
3 and 4, the children had to name the color that the fruit and
vegetables should have had (i.e., banana – yellow, lettuce – green,
etc.). The time (in seconds) required for naming the colors of
all 25 items per page was measured. As dependent variable, an
interference score was generated: time p.4 – [(time p.1 × time
p.3)/(time p.1 + time p.3); Archibald and Kerns, 1999)]. Scoring
high on this task is an indication of a lower ability to successfully
inhibit the prepotent response of naming the items’ actual colors
on page 4.
ToM task
Theory of mind ability was assessed by a cartoon task developed
by Völlm et al. (2006) for adults and adapted by Sebastian et al.
(2012) for adolescents. The cartoon scenarios were presented on a
computer screen. Each story consisted of ﬁve pictures with black-
and-white line drawings depicting two individuals in order to
control for social content (Figure 1). The ﬁrst three story frames
appeared consecutively, followed by two pictures shown simulta-
neously that displayed possible endings of the story. Children were
instructed to choose the correct ending by pressing the X-key on a
QWERTZ keyboard for the left-hand side, and the M-key for the
right-hand side picture. In order to give a correct answer, children
had to infer the mental state of one protagonist and the appro-
priate response by the other protagonist. Interstimulus intervals
ranged from 1,000 to 3,000 ms. The order of the cartoons and
the location of the correct ending were randomized across partic-
ipants. Correct responses for each story were coded as 1, incorrect
responses as 0.
The original task by Sebastian et al. (2012) consisted of 30 car-
toons, 10 in eachof three conditions: cognitiveToM,affectiveToM,
and a physical control condition. The physical control condition
was used as baseline in order to determine neuronal activity in an
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) setting. Because
the current study did not use fMRI, and a baseline condition was
not relevant, the physical condition was excluded. The remaining
20 cartoons (10 cognitive, 10 affective) were pretested for clarity,
difﬁculty, and timings in children who were of similar age to those
in our study and did not participate in the present study. Twelve
cartoons (six cognitive ToM, six affective ToM) of mid-range dif-
ﬁculty were selected in order to limit the time demands of the task
and to ensure sufﬁcient variability in the data.
Each child was presented with six cognitive and six affective
ToM stories. To choose the correct ending for the cognitive sce-
narios, children had to infer the appropriate behavior of one
protagonist (e.g., helping) given the inferred intentions, desires,
or beliefs of the other protagonist (e.g., attaining an action goal;
Figure 1A). For the affective scenarios, participants needed to
infer the appropriate response (e.g., consoling) of one protago-
nist regarding the emotional state (e.g., fear, sadness) of the other
(Figure 1B). Performance on cognitive and affective trials was
highly associated in our study (at t1: r = 0.83, p ≤ 0.001; at t2:
r = 0.94, p ≤ 0.001). Thus, for reasons of simplicity and in line
with the focus of the current paper, a model that did not dif-
ferentiate between cognitive and affective aspects was chosen for
further analyses. This one-factor model ﬁtted the empirical data
well at both time points, t1: χ2(9) = 17.11, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.99,
RMSEA = 0.024, WRMR = 0.765, t2: χ2(9) = 14.85, p = 0.095,
CFI = 0.988, RMSEA = 0.020, WRMR = 0.650. However, two
items were excluded due to factor loadings falling under a gen-
eral cutoff value (0.40) for the inclusion into one factor (Stevens,
2001).
In addition, the ﬁnal version of the task was validated in a
sample of 7.5- to 10-year-old children (N = 62, M age = 8.23,
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FIGURE 1 | Five pictures of one cartoon story for cognitive ToM
(A) and affective ToM (B). The ﬁrst three pictures appeared on a
computer screen consecutively, the last two pictures appeared
simultaneously. Children were instructed to select the correct ending
by pressing a key. For illustration, the frame of the correct ending is
marked black.
SD = 0.59, 35.5% girls) in order to ensure its association with
standard ToM measures.
The standard ToM measures employed were two second-order
false-belief tasks (Perner and Wimmer, 1985; Hollebrandse et al.,
2012), a German version of the Extended Theory-of-Mind Scale
(Henning et al., 2012) and German translations of the Strange
Stories Test (Happé, 1994). Results showed that the total score
of the standard ToM measures was positively correlated with the
ToM cartoons total score (affective and cognitive cartoons com-
bined) after controlling for language (r = 0.29, p = 0.025) or ﬂuid
intelligence (r = 0.32, p = 0.047).
Fluid intelligence
To measure ﬂuid intelligence the Number-Symbol Test of the Ger-
man version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children was
used (Petermann and Petermann, 2007). The child was instructed
to redraw symbols (e.g., a half moon) that were paired with either
simple ﬁgures (e.g., a cross with a circle inside; Version A for 6-
to 7-year-olds) or digits (1–9; Version B for 8- to 16-year-olds)
as quickly as possible within 120 s. For both versions A and B,
the dependent variable was the amount of correct symbols allo-
cated within 120 s. For version A, extra points could be achieved
if participants ﬁnished the task before the 120 s were over.
PROCEDURE
At both t1 and t2, children were assessed for two 50-min sessions
spaced 1 week apart. Assessments were part of a larger battery of
tasks that were conducted separately with each child by a specif-
ically trained PhD student or research assistant in a quiet room
either in a school setting or at home. The order of the larger
battery of tasks was counterbalanced across participants (blocks
of ABCD/BADC) but the order did not show any effect when
subsequently analyzed.
DATA ANALYSIS
All analyses were run using Mplus 7.11 (Muthén and Muthén,
1998–2012). The rate of missing data was low on all variables at t1
(≤1.8) and at t2 (≤7.2). Assumingdata to bemissing at random, all
missing values were accounted for by full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) estimation.
Research questions were answered by means of structural
equation modeling (SEM). As mentioned above, model ﬁt was
considered acceptable only if absolute ﬁt indices fulﬁlled the fol-
lowing criteria: CFI ≥ 0.95, RMSEA ≤ 0.08, WRMRV ≤ 1.0 (Yu,
2002; Geiser, 2010).
The cartoon stories were entered in the analyses as categorical
indicators (1 for choosing the correct ending, 0 for an incorrect
choice). As the χ2 depends on sample size and is overly sensitive
to deviations from perfect ﬁt in large samples (Schermelleh-Engel
et al., 2003).
In order to answer the ﬁrst research question (the extension
of the EF–ToM relationship to middle childhood) the concurrent
correlations between each EF subcomponent and ToM at t1 and t2
were examined (EF-t1 – ToM-t1 and EF-t2 – ToM-t2). In addition,
the correlation coefﬁcients at t1 and t2 were statistically compared
in order to determinewhether the EF–ToMassociationwas equally
strong at each time point. This procedure was followed for each of
the three EF subcomponents in order to detect possible differential
relations.
To answer the second research question (the longitudinal rela-
tions betweenEFandToMover a 1-year period), three cross-lagged
models were ﬁt to the data, describing the assumed interrelations
between each EF subcomponent and ToM over time. By control-
ling for initial levels of the target variable, cross-lagged models
ensure that the association of one variable as developmental pre-
cursor of another variable is examined, rather than concurrent
associations (McAlister and Peterson, 2013). Subsequently, regres-
sion coefﬁcients for the cross-lagged paths were compared in order
to evaluate for which direction the association was stronger, i.e.,
ToM-t1 to EF-t2 or EF-t1 to ToM-t2.
In all analyses, ToM was entered as latent and the three EF
subcomponents (attention shifting,WM updating and inhibition)
as manifest variables. Moreover, ﬂuid intelligence, age and gender
which are known to be related to EF and ToM were included as
manifest control variables.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVES
Descriptive statistics of the assessed variables are shown in Table 1.
At both measurement time points, medium scores were achieved
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Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of assessed variables (EF subcomponents attention shifting,WM updating, inhibition, andToM cartoon task) for
the two measurement time points (t1 and t2) and mean comparison results.
t1 t2 t
M SD Min.–max. M SD Min.–max.
Attention shifting 15.6 4.7 0–22 18.1 3.9 0–22 −24.2***
WM updating 6.1 1.6 0–16 6.6 1.5 0–16 −11.1***
Inhibitiona 24.9 8.8 0–89b 20.6 6.9 0–66b 23.2***
ToMc 8.5 1.7 0–10 9.2 1.3 1–10 −14.5***
Fluid intelligenced 51.4 9.2 27–80b / / / /
ToM, theory of mind; a interference measure (negatively polarized); bmin and/or max values are theoretically inﬁnite, thus table values are sample-speciﬁc; caverage
number of correct trials; donly the t1 measurement of ﬂuid intelligence was included in the analysis; ***p ≤ 0.001.
on WM updating, inhibition and ﬂuid intelligence, medium to
high scores on attention shifting and high scores on ToM. Inter-
correlations between the three EF subcomponents ranged from
0.27 to 0.35 (all ps ≤ 0.001) at t1 and from 0.28 to 0.33 at t2 (all
ps ≤ 0.001). On average, participants improved in the EF and ToM
tasks from t1 to t2, indicating a signiﬁcant developmental change
in those abilities within a year.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: CONCURRENT ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN EF
SUBCOMPONENTS AND ToM
The ﬁrst research question concerned the concurrent correlations
at both time points controlled for age, gender, and ﬂuid intel-
ligence, that is, the association between EF subcomponents and
ToM at t1 and t2 (see Table 2). At both time points, correlations
were small but signiﬁcant (ranging from0.10 to 0.20; Cohen,1988)
indicating that EF subcomponents and ToM were associated in 6–
11 year-olds and in 7–12 year-olds. Testing the strength of the
concurrent path coefﬁcients against each other showed that for
each EF subcomponent the difference of t1 and t2 concurrent cor-
relations with ToM was not signiﬁcant (attention shifting: χ2
(1) = 0.041, p = 0.84; WM updating: χ2 (1) = 3.285, p = 0.07;
inhibition: χ2 (1) = 0.037, p = 0.85).
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: RECIPROCAL INFLUENCES BETWEEN EF
SUBCOMPONENTS AND ToM ACROSS 1 YEAR
Figure 2 shows the cross-lagged models for the interrelation
between each EF subcomponent and ToM over time controlled
for initial levels of the outcome variable at t1 as well as for the
covariates age, gender, and ﬂuid intelligence.
The model for attention shifting (Figure 2A) ﬁtted the data
well, χ2 (259) = 321.13, p = 0.005, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.012,
WRMR = 0.90. Both cross-lagged path coefﬁcients (attention
shifting-t1 to ToM-t2 andToM-t1 to attention shifting-t2) reached
signiﬁcance. Despite the high autocorrelations of attention shift-
ing and ToM from t1 to t2 (Figure 2A), and after controlling
for age, gender, and ﬂuid intelligence, the cross-lagged paths still
revealed a small but signiﬁcant association of EF on ToM, and vice
versa, across the 1-year period. Testing the strength of the cross-
lagged path coefﬁcients against each other showed a signiﬁcant
difference, χ2 (1) = 7.999, p < 0.01, with a stronger association
Table 2 | Concurrent correlations between EF subcomponents andToM
at t1 and t2, respectively, controlled for age, gender, and fluid
intelligence.
ToM-t1 ToM-t2
Attention shifting-t1 0.19** Attention shifting-t2 0.20**
WM updating-t1 0.13** WM updating-t2 0.20**
Inhibition-t1a −0.08* Inhibition-t2 −0.10**
aInterference measure (negatively polarized); **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed.
leading from attention shifting-t1 to ToM-t2 than in the opposite
direction.
The model for WM updating (Figure 2B) also ﬁtted the data
well, χ2 (259) = 328.75, p = 0.002, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.013,
WRMR = 0.91. Again, both cross-lagged path coefﬁcients (WM-t1
to ToM-t2 and ToM-t1 to WM-t2) revealed a small, but sig-
niﬁcant impact over and above the high autocorrelations over
time and possible effects of the control variables. The differ-
ence between the cross-lagged path coefﬁcients was marginally
signiﬁcant, χ2 (1) = 3.42, p = 0.064, with a stronger asso-
ciation leading from WM-t1 to ToM-t2 than in the opposite
direction.
The model for inhibition (Figure 2C) also ﬁtted the data well,
χ2 (259) = 316.28, p = 0.009, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.012,
WRMR = 0.90. However, for this model neither of the cross-
lagged path coefﬁcients reached signiﬁcance. Thus, for the EF
subcomponent inhibitionno signiﬁcant cross-lagged relationships
with ToM over time were found.
DISCUSSION
The present study pursued two objectives. First, we examined
whether the relationship between EF and ToM pertains in middle
childhood (6–12 years). Results showed small but signiﬁcant con-
current correlations in the expected directions between all studied
EF subcomponents (attention shifting, WM updating and inhi-
bition) and ToM. In line with previous research (Perner et al.,
2002; Yang et al., 2009; Calderon et al., 2010), better abilities
in executive control of thought or action were related to better
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FIGURE 2 | Cross-lagged models for the relations betweenToM and
the EF subcomponents attention shifting (A),WM updating (B), and
inhibition (C), at the two measurement points, controlling for age,
gender, fluid intelligence, as well as for the earlier levels of the target
variables. aInterference measure (negatively polarized); **p ≤ 0.01,
*p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed.
understanding of others’ mental states at t1 (6–11 years) and
t2 (7–12 years). Second, we explored whether each EF subcom-
ponent at t1 predicted ToM at t2, or vice versa, over a 1-year
period. Here, we used a cross-lagged model, again controlling
for age, gender and ﬂuid intelligence, as well as for the earlier
levels of the target variables. Results showed small, but signif-
icant bidirectional longitudinal relationships with ToM for two
EF subcomponents, WM updating and attention shifting. Exam-
ining the strength of the associations showed that for both EF
subcomponents, the relationship between early EF and later ToM
was stronger than the relationship between early ToM and later
EF. Bearing in mind that effect sizes were small this corresponds
with research on longitudinal studies between EF and ToM in
preschool-age children (e.g., Hughes, 1998b) and illustrates the
pertaining relevance of the ability to switch between different
task demands and the ability to temporarily hold information
in mind while processing it for developing ToM abilities. For
the subcomponent inhibition, however, no reciprocal relation-
ships were found over time. Thus, discriminating between EF
subcomponents seems to be important for the study of EF–ToM
development, because on the one hand, the single EF subcom-
ponents may follow different developmental courses and on the
other hand, understanding the mental states of others at various
levels (e.g., ﬁrst- or second-order perspective) may put different
demands on EF subcomponents.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE EF SUBCOMPONENTS AND
ToM IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD
The relationship between EF subcomponents and ToM is well doc-
umented in the preschool years (e.g., Frye et al., 1995; Hughes,
1998a; Carlson and Moses, 2001). However, still in need of clar-
iﬁcation is the question how exactly this relationship extends to
middle childhood for each of the EF subcomponents. To date,
there are few studies in children beyond the preschool age, and, as
we will discuss below, those conducted are inconclusive. Results of
the present study indicate that the relationship between all three
EF subcomponents (attention shifting, WM updating, inhibition)
and ToM pertain in middle childhood with small, but signiﬁcant
correlations (age, gender, and ﬂuid intelligence partialled out).
In a sample of similar-aged children (8.5-year-olds) Charman
et al. (2001) also found a correlation between EF (GoNoGo error
score) and ToM (Happé stories correct mental score) for their
typically developing control group (r = −0.43, p < 0.01). How-
ever, as soon as age and intelligence were partialled out, their
results fell below signiﬁcance (r = −0.38, p = 0.10). This may
be owing to the low statistical power due to the relatively small
size of their control group (N = 22). The diverging results to
the present study may also come from the use of different mea-
sures. Charman et al. (2001) assessed ToM by means of Happé’s
Strange Stories (Happé, 1994), a measure of higher-order ToM
ability. The Strange Stories task consists of naturalistic, short
vignettes which are read to the child by the experimenter. The
task makes strong demands on verbal ability. In contrast, in the
present study, a ToM cartoon task was used. It is a non-verbal
task that was originally developed for fMRI studies (Völlm et al.,
2006). Each cartoon story is presented on a computer screen, and
the correct answer is chosen by pressing a key. Because of the
lower verbal task demands of the ToM cartoon test, children in the
present study were probably not impaired in expressing their ToM
ability.
Turning to EF, Charman et al. (2001) examined different sub-
components (planning and behavioral inhibition) compared to
our study. Generally, the fact that different studies involve various
aspects of EF makes comparisons between studies difﬁcult. This
inconsistency might be due to the fact that EF is an ill-deﬁned con-
struct that has been described as an umbrella term for a large array
of different processes involved in self-control (Kerr and Zelazo,
2004). The EF deﬁnition applied in the current study follows
Miyake et al.’s (2000) division into three overlapping but distinct
subcomponents – attention shifting, WM updating, and inhibi-
tion. This approach has proved promising and has been adopted
in studies on the relations between ToM and EF in preschool
children.
Another problem when comparing different studies on EF–
ToM relations is that the available tasks do not test only one
EF subcomponent, but engage overlapping EF aspects to varying
degrees. The planning tasks employed by Charman et al. (2001)
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 655 | 7
Austin et al. Executive function and theory of mind
displays this task impurity to a rather high degree because more
than one EF subcomponentwas needed tomeet the relatively com-
plex task requirements (Miyake et al., 2000). Because the present
study used simpler tasks, which mainly required one EF subcom-
ponent, children could probably express their EF capacities in an
optimal way. This may be another reason why we, unlike Charman
et al. (2001) still found small but signiﬁcant EF–ToMrelations in 6-
to 12-year-olds after controlling for age, gender, and intelligence.
Our results are supported by a study in slightly younger chil-
dren (41/2–61/2 year-olds) where strong relationships between
several EF and ToM tasks were found even when controlling for
age and IQ and despite the relatively small sample size (N = 22)
of their control group (Perner et al., 2002). These similar ﬁnd-
ings can possibly be attributed to the fact that similar measures
were implemented. Perner et al. (2002) used a second-order false-
belief task (based on the material by Perner and Wimmer, 1985).
We argue that at least 6 out of 10 of our ToM cartoon stories
require second-order reasoning. Because the cartoons were orig-
inally used in a study with a different focus - differentiating ToM
into cognitive and affective aspects - Sebastian et al. (2012) did
not address the issue of ﬁrst- or second-order ToM reasoning.
What they did maintain was that the affective condition requires
cognitive ToM. Yet, in the six affective ToM cartoon tasks, in
order to give a correct response, the participant has to under-
stand the ﬁrst protagonist’s belief about the second protagonist’s
mental state (e.g., the adult believes/thinks the child is sad because
the child does not want the kite to ﬂy away; i.e., second-order
ToM). In the four cognitive ToM cartoon tasks, however, in order
to choose the correct ending, the participant has to infer the
desire of only one of the protagonists (e.g., the girl places the
ladder against the tree because she wants an apple; i.e., ﬁrst-
order ToM). The second protagonist merely accompanies the ﬁrst
protagonist.
We also tested possible differences in the strength of the con-
current relationship between EF subcomponents and ToM at both
time points. We had no reason to hypothesize that there would
be any change in the EF–ToM relations in the space of 1 year in
6 to 12-year-olds. The present results showed precisely this, sug-
gesting that all three EF subcomponents and ToM remain related,
with not much change in the strength of the relations across a
1-year-period, in a representative sample in middle childhood.
THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EF SUBCOMPONENTS AND
ToM
The secondaimof thepresent study explored the longitudinal bidi-
rectional relationship between the three EF subcomponents and
ToM over a 1-year period. In a cross-lagged model, we again con-
trolled for age, gender, and ﬂuid intelligence, and also partialled
out earlier EF or ToM performance. Our ﬁndings revealed small,
but signiﬁcant reciprocal relations with ToM for two EF subcom-
ponents, attention shifting and WM updating, but no relations for
inhibition. The lacking longitudinal relations between inhibition
and ToM may indicate that this EF subcomponent is of less impor-
tance for ToM in middle childhood as compared to the preschool
age, particularly over time. The different results for the three EF
subcomponents underlines the necessity of examining EF devel-
opment divided into its speciﬁc subcomponents. Interestingly, for
both attention shifting andWMupdating, the relationship of early
EF predicting later ToM was stronger than the relationship of early
ToM predicting later EF (the difference for WM updating was
marginally signiﬁcant). Although our effect sizes were small, this
ﬁnding supports Russell’s (1996) theory that EF precedes ToM
development and is in line with results of previous longitudinal
studies on EF–ToM relationship in preschool-age children.
One of the earliest such studies found that in 3- to 4-year-old
children (mean age: 3 years and 11 months) early EF performance
predicted later ToM (13 months later) even when controlling
for age, verbal ability, and initial ToM (Hughes, 1998b). The
reverse direction was not found, which has been interpreted
as evidence for Russel’s theory. However, only one of the EF
measures, a detour-reaching box (Hughes and Russell, 1993), a
measure of inhibitory control, showed an independent predic-
tive relationship with later ToM in Hughes’s study. The other
EF subcomponents (WM, planning, attention shifting) did not.
Interestingly, in the present study with older children, the only
two EF subcomponents that showed small but signiﬁcant rela-
tionships with ToM over time were attention shifting and WM
updating, but not inhibition. A possible explanation for this ﬁnd-
ing may be that preschool-age children are still in the course of
developing their inhibitory skills and thus rely on these more
heavily. This is reﬂected in medium to high longitudinal cor-
relations between inhibition and ToM. In addition, it may also
be that ﬁrst-order false-belief tasks (as used by Hughes) make
more demands on inhibitory skills compared to second-order
ToM items (as mainly used in the present study). In ﬁrst-order
false-belief tasks, the child’s own knowledge about reality has to
be inhibited in order to give a correct answer. To solve second-
order ToM tasks, inhibition may play less of an important role,
because the focus lies more on being able to switch ﬂexibly
between the different mindsets of the ﬁrst and second protago-
nist (Miller, 2009). Also, WM updating is needed to keep track
of the different perspectives and bringing all the relevant infor-
mation together. The exact nature of the relationship between
different EF subcomponents and ToM across childhood requires
further research.
Just like Hughes’s (1998b) study, Carlson et al.’s (2004) longi-
tudinal study in a younger group of children (2-year-olds) showed
similar asymmetrical relationships: early EF predicted later ToM
(15 months later) even when controlling for age, gender, and ver-
bal ability. However, as mentioned in the introduction, Carlson
et al.’s (2004) results must be interpreted with caution as ToM was
assessed with different measures at the two time points and did
not correlate over time.
Another longitudinal study by Hughes and Ensor (2007) exam-
ined the predictive relationship between EF and ToM at three time
points in 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds. Results showed only limited sup-
port for Perner (1998), Perner and Lang’s (1999) theory – that
early ToM predicts later EF – but stronger support for Russell’s
(1996) theory – that early EF predicts later ToM. One advantage
of their study was that they included participants from a variety
of social backgrounds. This issue has been neglected in previ-
ous research despite the fact that socioeconomic status (SES) is
known to predict cognitive abilities (Bradley and Corwyn, 2002)
and may have an impact on the EF–ToM relationship (Hughes and
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Ensor, 2007). Although only little is known about the impact of
SES on EF or ToM development in middle childhood, the present
study established a representative sample by preselecting schools
from different socio-economic backgrounds in both rural and
urban communities. Therefore, the present results are probably
not affected by possible SES effects.
Turningnow toourﬁndings of reciprocity, although thepresent
study showed stronger relationships leading from early attention
shifting and WM updating to later ToM, one cannot dismiss
the fact that the relationship was bidirectional. That is to say,
there were indeed small, but signiﬁcant relations in the oppo-
site direction. We did not expect this ﬁnding because previous
longitudinal studies almost consistently showed a unidirectional
association in which early EF predicted later ToM and not vice
versa (Hughes, 1998b; Carlson et al., 2004; Flynn et al., 2004;
Jahromi and Stifter, 2008; Müller et al., 2012). However, in line
with our ﬁndings, Hughes and Ensor (2007) also found partial
support for early ToM – later EF, but stronger evidence for early
EF – later ToM. Likewise, McAlister and Peterson (2013) found
that ToM at 3 years 3 months to 5 years 6 months predicted EF
at about 1 year later, but they did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation
in the opposite direction. Moreover, Kloo and Perner’s (2003)
training study in 3- to 4-year-olds suggested a bidirectional rela-
tionship between EF and ToM because transfer of training took
place in both directions. They took their results to support the
idea of a functional dependence between the two constructs in
that “understanding the mind presupposes a certain degree of
executive control, and EF presupposes a certain level of insight
into the mind” (Kloo and Perner, 2003, p.1836). It has been sug-
gested elsewhere that the EF–ToM relationship can be interpreted
in reciprocal terms with one construct complementing the other
(Putko, 2009). However, as noted by Kloo and Perner (2003), their
study cannot clarify the causes and processes involved that are
responsible for this relationship. Both constructs may be related
in an indirect way, that is, individuals with well-developed EF may
be better equipped to function well in social groups and this then
encourages improvements in ToM (Hughes, 2001). Further stud-
ies are needed to shed more light on the relationship between EF
and ToM in reciprocal terms and on the exact interplay of the
two constructs, especially for the age range beyond the preschool
years.
In sum, although a few studies have shown that early ToM
predicts later EF, the majority of longitudinal studies conducted
so far reveal more evidence for the view that early EF pre-
dicts later ToM. However, the existing longitudinal research has
almost exclusively focused on the preschool or late toddlerhood
years. To our knowledge, the current study is the ﬁrst to ﬁnd
longitudinal support suggesting that early EF subcomponents pre-
dict later ToM in a representative sample in middle childhood.
This is an interesting ﬁnding as it suggests that although sufﬁ-
cient cognitive capacities have developed, a higher level of EF
(WM updating and attention shifting) continues to be associ-
ated with a higher level of ToM. Thus, especially the ability to
switch between different task demands and the ability to tem-
porarily hold information in mind while processing it seem to be
important for understanding mental states in middle childhood.
The importance of these two EF subcomponents is reﬂected in
second-order false-belief tasks, the most commonly used ToM
task in older children. In order to make a correct inference
on this task, the different perspectives of the mindsets of the
two protagonists need to be taken into account (attention shift-
ing) and, in addition, all the pieces of information need to be
actively held in mind and updated (WM updating). Thus it
appears that while children progress through childhood and their
social contexts become increasingly complex (e.g., school entry
in which friendships and relationships to peers and teachers are
formed), attention shifting and WM updating are needed for
the children to make sense of and function within their social
surroundings.
LIMITATIONS AND OUTLOOK
Aproblemwhich has been discussed in the literature is the possible
difﬁculty that childrenmay have to express their existing ToMabil-
ities due to the EF requirements inherent in the ToM task (Carlson
and Moses, 2001; Moses, 2001). Referring to the instruments in
our study, it is possible that our ToM cartoon requires EF demands
which may explain the concurrent as well as the longitudinal cor-
relations between the two constructs. However, several arguments
speak against this. Many children completed our ToMcartoon task
successfully, which implies that the EF demands were not overly
high. In addition, it may be that our ToM cartoon task measures
WM capacity, producing a task impurity problem (Miyake et al.,
2000). For each cartoon, three pictures were shown consecutively,
which had to be remembered by the child in order to choose the
correct ending. But because the pictures were presented in quick
succession, they resembled a cartoon ﬁlm strip with an easy script,
not making overly high demands on WM capacity. However, even
if the latter were to be the case, children were not required to men-
tally process or re-arrange the pictures in any way. Therefore, these
potential task demands cannot explain the relations with updating
of WM which was one of our EF subcomponent.
Another argument on the same lines is that the relation between
attention shifting and ToM may result from the fact that both tasks
require shifting between pressing the left and right key. However,
the ToMcartoons did not call for shifting between different answer
sets or for abandoning an acquired rule of alternating between
pressing the left and right key (as the attention shifting task did).
In the 10 ToM cartoons, children just had to decide which of the
two presented pictures displayed the correct ending, and they had
ample time to press the appropriate key. The high rate of correct
responses for the ToM cartoons indicates that this task was rather
easy for the children. Therefore, we take the relations between
attention shifting andToMas evidence that ourToMtasks required
attention shifting with respect to inferring the mental states of the
two displayed protagonists (rather than with respect to the task
design).
Second, further studies on longitudinal relations between EF
subcomponents and ToM in middle childhood should include
more than two time points. This would not only show how the
EF–ToM relationship develops over a longer period, but also allow
an investigation of moderating or mediating factors.
Furthermore, although our study yielded innovative ﬁndings,
it would be interesting to use more than one ToM and more than
one task for each EF subcomponent. Using more measures would
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no doubt increase reliability, and it would shed further light on
relations between EF subcomponents and different aspects of ToM
that emerge in middle childhood (e.g., second-order false-belief,
irony, contrary emotion; Happé, 1994).
In conclusion, the current study suggests that the relation-
ship between three EF subcomponents (attention shifting, WM
updating, inhibition) and ToM pertains in a representative sam-
ple in middle childhood. Partial evidence was provided for the
assumption that early ToM predicts later EF (Carruthers, 1996;
Perner, 1998; Perner and Lang, 1999, 2000) but there was stronger
support for the proposal that early EF (attention shifting, WM
updating) predicts later ToM (Russell, 1996). In addition, our
results suggest a reciprocity in the EF–ToM relationship over a 1-
year-period. Future studies are needed to shed more light on the
precise interplay of the two constructs, especially with respect to
subcomponents of both EF and ToM, in the course of childhood
development.
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